Examining the Relationship Between Arab States and Israel: Complexities Beyond the Public Narrative
The ongoing conflict in Gaza has raised significant questions about the role of neighboring Arab states and Gulf countries in their responses to Israel’s military actions and the resulting humanitarian crisis. This report examines the complex relationship between these nations and Israel, particularly investigating claims that these Arab nations secretly support Israel’s actions while publicly maintaining pro-Palestinian positions.
Historical Context: Gulf States and Palestinian Relations
The relationship between Gulf states and Palestinians has evolved significantly over decades. Historically, Gulf countries have hosted significant Palestinian populations, though primarily as economic migrants rather than refugees. More than 600,000 Palestinians live in Gulf states, representing approximately a quarter of the Palestinian diaspora[1]. However, these communities consist primarily of skilled professionals and those with financial means, rather than impoverished refugees who populate camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan[1].
This selective immigration policy has created a unique dynamic whereby Gulf states maintain economic relationships with educated Palestinians while keeping a certain distance from broader refugee crises. This approach has allowed them to balance domestic concerns with their public stance on the Palestinian cause.
The Abraham Accords and Shifting Alliances
A significant turning point came with the 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), making it the first Gulf country to formally establish diplomatic ties with Israel[2]. Bahrain quickly followed suit. These agreements formalized what had long been informal but robust foreign relations between these nations and Israel[2].
This normalization process marked a dramatic shift in regional dynamics, as supporting Palestine and condemning Israel had historically played a central role in the foreign policy discourse of Gulf monarchies[3]. The agreements explicitly challenged the longstanding Arab consensus that normalization with Israel should only come after the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Divergent Responses to the Gaza Conflict
Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, Gulf states have demonstrated notably varied responses:
Official Positions
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have collectively expressed criticism of Israel and the United States while calling for an immediate ceasefire[4]. However, there are significant disparities in their individual approaches:
- Saudi Arabia suspended normalization talks with Israel to align with pro-Palestinian sentiment[5]
- Qatar intensified mediation efforts and expanded humanitarian support[5]
- The UAE and Bahrain, having normalized relations with Israel, adopted more cautious stances[5]
- Oman maintained a position of neutrality[5]
- Kuwait upheld a strongly pro-Palestinian position[5]
This lack of unified action highlights the fragmented nature of GCC diplomacy, driven by diverging national priorities and geopolitical alliances[5].
Evidence of Collaboration with Israel
Despite public condemnation of Israel’s military actions in Gaza, there is evidence of ongoing strategic cooperation between some Gulf states and Israel:
Intelligence Sharing and Security Cooperation
Recent reports indicate that several Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, provided critical intelligence to help Israel counter Iranian attacks in April 2024[6][7]. According to these reports, Iranian missiles and drones were tracked by radar systems in Gulf Arab states upon their launch, with this intelligence being swiftly relayed to enable interception[6].
The cooperation was reportedly spearheaded by the United States, which has sought to foster informal alliances among Arab nations to counter Iran’s expanding influence[6]. Some Arab militaries allegedly took an active role in intercepting these threats, though the full extent of Saudi Arabia’s involvement is being kept quiet[7].
Economic Relationships
Even amid the Gaza conflict, trade relationships established through normalization agreements continue. The UAE emerged as Israel’s top Arab trading partner following the Abraham Accords[8][9]. Critics argue that this economic relationship has continued during the conflict, effectively providing financial support to Israel while Palestinians suffer under siege[8][9].
Refusal to Accept Refugees: Political Calculation or Antipathy?
A central question in the premise concerns why neighboring countries refuse to accept Palestinian refugees from Gaza. The evidence suggests this is motivated by political considerations rather than antipathy toward Palestinians:
Fear of Demographic Changes
Both Egypt and Jordan have explicitly refused to accept refugees, with Jordan’s King Abdullah stating, “No refugees in Jordan, no refugees in Egypt. That is a red line”[10]. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi expressed concern that Israel’s military campaign was “not just aimed at fighting Hamas… but also an attempt to push the civilian inhabitants to… migrate to Egypt”[11].
This refusal stems from fears that accepting refugees would play into what they perceive as Israel’s strategy to permanently displace Palestinians, thereby undermining Palestinian claims to statehood[11][12]. El-Sissi specifically warned that an exodus from Gaza was intended to “eliminate the Palestinian cause… the most important cause of our region”[11].
Similar positions have been taken by other nominally pro-Palestinian countries such as Turkey, Qatar, Algeria, Kuwait, and Malaysia, which express support for Palestinians while refusing to accept refugees[10].
Public vs. Private Positions
The relationship between Gulf states and Israel reveals a notable divergence between public rhetoric and private actions:
Social Media Discourse vs. Government Policy
Research on social media discourse within Gulf states found that while real rapprochement was occurring between Gulf regimes and Israel, social media discourse remained largely antagonistic toward Israel[13]. Only approximately 25% of analyzed Twitter accounts encouraged normalization with Israel, with the majority of support coming from Saudi Arabia and Qatar[13].
This suggests that even as governments pursue strategic relationships with Israel, public opinion in these countries remains largely pro-Palestinian and critical of Israel.
Looking Forward: Peacekeeping Role in Gaza
Some Gulf states now appear to be positioning themselves for a role in post-conflict Gaza. The UAE has recently called for a multinational force to deploy to Gaza to provide security after a permanent ceasefire is brokered[14]. Bahrain has also reportedly signaled privately that it will participate in such a force[14].
This potential involvement represents a significant shift for Gulf monarchies, which have historically avoided direct engagement with the Israel-Palestine conflict in favor of focusing on economic development at home[14].
Conclusion: A Complex Reality Beyond Simple Narratives
The evidence does not fully support that Gulf Arab states are secretly supporting Israel’s actions in Gaza due to antipathy toward Palestinians. Instead, a more nuanced picture emerges:
Gulf states are engaged in a complex balancing act between multiple competing interests: maintaining strategic ties with the United States, countering perceived Iranian threats, pursuing economic development, responding to domestic public opinion, and maintaining their traditional support for the Palestinian cause.
While there is evidence of strategic cooperation with Israel, particularly regarding intelligence sharing and normalization agreements, most Gulf states have publicly criticized Israel’s actions in Gaza and called for a ceasefire. The refusal to accept refugees appears motivated primarily by concerns about permanent displacement of Palestinians rather than revulsion toward them.
The lack of unified action from Gulf states reflects their divergent national interests rather than a coordinated approach to the conflict. As the situation evolves, Gulf states appear to be positioning themselves for potential roles in post-conflict Gaza, suggesting their engagement with the Palestinian issue remains an important, if complicated, aspect of their foreign policy.
- https://merip.org/1985/05/the-palestinian-diaspora-of-the-gulf/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–United_Arab_Emirates_normalization_agreement
- https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9eb9648db369320e67bdf0fe308bbae33fc21ea6
- https://ecfr.eu/article/national-interests-and-regional-turmoil-the-gulf-states-view-on-gaza-and-the-red-sea/
- https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91d74aa42b0b485bf223fdf07461d90db8896dd5
- https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/gulf-arab-states-provide-critical-intelligence-to-help-israel-counter-iranian-attacks-wsj/
- https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-gulf-states-including-saudi-arabia-provided-intelligence-on-iran-attack/
- https://ilkha.com/english/world/the-gulfs-quiet-complicity-how-persian-gulf-states-are-enabling-israel-s-war-on-gaza-451760
- https://www.ilkha.com/english/world/the-gulfs-quiet-complicity-how-persian-gulf-states-are-enabling-israel-s-war-on-gaza-451760
- https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/10/17/egypt-jordan-and-other-arab-governments-reject-gazan-refugees/
- https://apnews.com/article/palestinian-jordan-egypt-israel-refugee-502c06d004767d4b64848d878b66bd3d
- https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-11-03/arab-countries-unwilling-accept-palestinian-refugees-gaza
- https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c26fb81b3783fcafe00e9e7aa43d2ff8dbfb3cb
- https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/war-on-gaza-why-gulf-states-want-send-peacekeepers-gaza-strip